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Culture can be broadly and briefly operationalized as a set of structures and institutions, 
values, traditions and ways of engaging with the social and nonsocial world that are transmitted 
across generations in a certain time and place (e.g., Shweder & LeVine, 1984). Culture is thus 
temporally and geographically situated and multilevel. It is situated because it takes place in a 
certain time and place and is dynamically transmitted over time and across place, changing as time 
and place change. It is multilevel because its influence can be observed in societal-level constructs 
such as structures and institutions, group-level constructs such as traditions and ways of engaging in 
the world, and individual-level constructs such as internalized norms, personally felt values, 
cognitive procedures and behaviors.  
Cultural psychology focuses both on the ways that societal processes influence societal-level 
outcomes and on the ways that these processes influence individuals, either directly or through their 
effect on group-level processes.1 Culture’s situated nature has implications for each level of 
conceptualization. One’s place within a society and the social networks within which one is 
embedded should influence which structural and institutional aspects of ‘culture’ one has access to. 
In this way, context and changes in context that occur, for example due to immigration, may 
(Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006) or may not (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005) 
carry with it cultural change depending in part on features of more proximal social networks before 
                                                
1 Of course thinking of the process of influence as unidirectional is a simplification. Just as 
cultures shape individual action and constitute individual psychologies, over time, individual action 
and psychology is likely to shape culture.  In this sense, our focus is on a simplified process model 
since a full discussion of culture requires both a multilevel model and additional examination of the 
more nuanced and complex bi-directional ways in which individuals influence societies. 
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and after contextual change. Thus, Kitayama and his colleagues provide evidence that living in or 
moving to Japan’s frontier areas is associated with higher individualism, in part due to the change in 
context. Atran and his colleagues use as their example differences in understanding of forest ecology 
among groups who live in somewhat different areas but importantly have differing contact with 
more expert groups, to show that cultural knowledge does not spread via physical moves but via 
social contact.   
Following from this operationalization of culture, a large number of differences at the 
societal level, group-process level, or individual-expression level are likely due to ‘culture.’ 
Unfortunately, such broad conceptualization can rob ‘culture’ of conceptual specificity, making it all 
but impossible to make specific predictions about how and when ‘culture’ matters. Perhaps for this 
reason, psychologists have sought basic organizing principles of cultures that could move the field 
beyond both broad generalizations and particularized description and set the stage for predictive 
model building.  A number of potentially useful basic organizing constructs (e.g., ‘tight’ vs. ‘loose’ 
cultures, Triandis, 1995; ‘masculine’ vs. ‘feminine’ cultures, Hofstede, 1980; survival vs. self-
expression, Inglehart 1997; honor-modesty vs. shame, Gregg, 2005; see also Cohen 2001), and 
frameworks (e.g., the ecocultural model, Berry, 1976, 1994; Georgas, 1988; 1993) have been 
proposed. To date the two constructs that most captured popular appeal are individualism and 
collectivism (e.g., Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Kashima, 2001; Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1995).  
Though use of individualism and collectivism as organizing constructs does provide the field 
with an organizing theme and focus for prediction and investigation, these organizing constructs 
alone do not provide a process model so that research relies on implicit process models.  In the 
current chapter we attempt to integrate these implicit models to describe both a multilevel and a 
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societal-level process model of culture. The multilevel model focuses on individual-level 
consequences of culture, and the societal-level model focuses on societal-level consequences of 
culture. Both models begin with the same basic societal-level antecedents, but one model is 
multilevel in that proximal antecedents and consequences are at the individual level and the other 
model remains societal-level in that all antecedents and consequences are at the societal level. Most 
psychological research focuses on individual-level consequences, implicitly if not explicitly evoking 
a multilevel model.   
In the following sections, we first operationalize individualism and collectivism as used both 
in multilevel and societal-level models, providing process models that pinpoint where research to 
date has concentrated and where gaps still exist. We operationalize a cultural psychological approach 
to the differing levels of analysis relevant to cultural psychology and ask what can and cannot be 
generalized from research using different levels of analysis given concerns about the ecological 
fallacy (see Chapters 1 and 2 for a detailed discussion of levels issues in cultural research) and 
Simpson’s paradox.  
 
Individualism and Collectivism: Operationalization, Assessment and Usage 
 Modern usage of the term individualism is closely connected with Hofstede (1980). In the 
1970’s Hofstede obtained employees’ ratings of workplace relevant values, averaged those into 
national scores and factor analyzed them (Hofstede, 1980; see also Leung & Bond, 1989). Hofstede 
described one of the emerging factors as individualism (high scores on this factor were anchored at 
individualism, low scores at collectivism). He defined individualism as a focus on rights above 
duties, a concern for oneself and immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-
fulfillment, and basing identity on one's personal accomplishments. By obtaining averages across 
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individuals, Hofstede obtained an average individual score that he used as a stand-in for a country-
level score that could be correlated with other country-level variables such as Gross National 
Product (GNP).  
A number of authors have followed Hofstede’s reasoning in thinking about country-level 
value syndromes, arguing that individualism is associated with modernity, democracy, wealth, 
urbanism, higher education, and educational systems focused on positive self-regard and autonomy. 
Thus for example, Inglehart (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) collected data separately as part of the World 
Values Survey, correlating national average value scores with national scores from other sources 
rating country-level attainment of education, gender equality, and other societal features. Authors 
using this perspective provide evidence supporting the case that collectivism as a worldview is 
associated with poverty, less education, hierarchical or cast-based societies and educational systems 
focused on self-improvement, obedience to authority, and acceptance of social structure (e.g., 
Kagitcibasi, 1997).  
While Hofstede was not interested in individual-level implications of cultural syndromes and 
attempted to obtain a country-level variable by averaging within-country individual responses, a 
number of researchers have developed individual-level value scales with a goal of individual-level 
assessment. Triandis and his colleagues have coined the terms allocentrism and idiocentrism to refer 
to these individual-level assessments (Triandis, in press; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, and Clark, 
1985). Individual-level consequences of individualism and collectivism have also been described for 
self-concept, cognitive style, and relationality (Kitayama et al., in press; Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002).  
In their review, Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) suggest the following individual-
level implications of individualism and collectivism. At the individual-level, individualism as a 
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cultural syndrome implies that the self is permanent, separate from context, trait-like, and a causal 
nexus; that reasoning is a tool to separate out main points from irrelevant background or context; and 
that relationships and group memberships are impermanent and non-intensive, strangers may 
become friends or allies, and current in-group memberships may be given up for others. Conversely, 
at the individual-level collectivism as a cultural syndrome implies that the self is malleable, context-
dependent and socially sensitive; that reasoning is a tool to link and make sense of the whole rather 
than disparate elements; and that relationships and group memberships are ascribed and fixed, “facts 
of life” to which people must accommodate. Strangers are not to be trusted; in- and out-group 
memberships are fixed.  
 
Predicting Individual-Level Outcome Variables  
A process model  
An integrated process model of the individual-level effects of culture is displayed as Figure 1 
(modified from Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002). The process model outlines the main 
presumed or tested links between societal and group-level antecedent factors and individual-level 
consequences. This simplified multilevel cultural process model draws attention to the likely 
influences of societal-level culture – structures, processes, systems, and artifacts – and internalized 
features of culture – values and norms, for how situations are understood -- subjective construals, 
and the consequences of these culture-laden construals for individual action at any point in time. 
Internalized features of culture are subjective, heterogeneous, and non-uniform so that both within 
and between group differences are to be expected. 
As presented from left to right in Figure 1, some general processes are assumed to apply. 
First, it is assumed that all human societies must have been influenced by evolutionary forces (e.g., 
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natural and sexual selection and adaptation) and the ecological (e.g., climate, geographical latitude) 
and natural (e.g., water supply and soil conditions) features of the environments in which they 
developed (box 1). These basic features influence both distal culture (history, language, and religion) 
(box 2) and the circumstances and extent that social connection and personal autonomy are valued 
(box 5). That is, we assume that all distal cultures and value systems have some elements of 
individualism and some elements of collectivism. Societies established in more environmentally and 
ecologically resource-rich contexts would be likely to have less need for interdependent action for 
survival and thus likely to have fewer structures and contexts that require or cue interdependence. 
Conversely societies established and developed in harsher environmental and ecological niches 
would be likely to have more need for interdependent action for survival and so would be likely to 
have more structures and contexts that require or cue interdependence (for more detailed models see 
Cohen, 2001; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier & Coon, 2002). Between-group differences emerge due to 
differences in the extent that independence and interdependence patterns are embedded in distal 
culture and differences in the frequency of everyday contexts in which these patterns are likely to be 
evoked. 
Though influenced by the environmental and ecological niche in which it was established, 
distal culture is assumed to be dynamically stable rather than static. That is, we expect distal culture 
to be permanent enough to have predictable consequences but not be completely fixed. Distal culture 
is assumed to influence social structural (educational, legal and economic systems and institutions, 
box 3), social situational (what families socialize children to be like, social roles within the family, 
the nature of everyday face-to-face interactions in school, with age-mates, on the street, at work, box 
4), and individually internalized culture (box 5). Individually internalized culture takes the form of 
values and norms. Social structures, social situations, and internalized values are likely to influence 
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the sense made of any particular situation (subjective construal of social situations, box 6). Distal 
culture, internalized values, and subjective construal have each been posited as paths to influencing 
individual outcomes (box 7). These include content of self-concept, cognition, affect, and behavior.  
We distinguish self-concept, cognition, affect and behavior from values not because we wish to 
argue that values are fundamentally different in structure than other cognitions but rather because 
content of self-concept, behavior, affect, and cognitive style have been described as consequences of 
individualism and collectivism while values have been described as individually internalized 
markers of individualism and collectivism. An alternative would be to posit that values are 
consequences of culture in the same way that self-concept, cognition and affect are without giving 
any preferred status to values. 
Common approaches to operationalization 
To date, three general approaches have dominated operationalization and measurement of 
individualism and collectivism in multilevel models. Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) 
have labeled these approaches ‘applying Hofstede’, using rating scales, and priming studies as 
outlined below. Each of these is presented in the process model as an explanatory path used to 
predict individual-level consequences of posited or assessed cultural differences. Each approach is 
outlined and incorporated into our multilevel model as detailed below. 
Applying Hofstede. The most common approach is ‘applying Hofstede’. That is, citing 
Hofstede as the rationale for one’s choices of country comparisons. Following the usage of 
Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) we use the term ‘applying’ rather than ‘following’ 
because this approach does not follow from Hofstede in the sense that he did not make the claims 
others make in his name. We have labeled this work as assuming a ‘Direct Distal Path’ between 
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distal country and individual outcomes in Figure 1 because that is what the researchers are doing in 
their empirical work.  
Researchers who ‘apply Hofstede’ assert that Hofstede’s (1980) ranking can be used to 
justify the choice of countries for cross-national comparison. These researchers imply that because 
Hofstede (1980) defined and calculated national aggregated individualism scores, his ratings can be 
treated as indicators of distal culture. Reading Hofstede’s initial and later work (Hofstede, 1980, 
2001) makes clear that he did not intend that his ratings be assumed to be fixed, and a number of 
papers have criticized this method (e.g., Bond & Tedeschi, 2001; Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 
2002; Singelis, 2000).  
One concern is a level of analysis issue. Researchers attempting to ‘apply Hofstede’ seem to 
assume that individuals from countries that ranked high on individualism are highly individualistic; 
individuals from countries ranked low in individualism are highly collectivistic (e.g., Hui, 1988). 
Even if researchers refrain from making this error, a number of broader concerns have also been 
raised in that Hofstede’s (1980) aggregated individualism scores are not really descriptive of distal 
culture (though studies that apply Hofstede typically assume a direct distal influence path). 
Aggregated individualism scores represent a nation-level aggregation of individual-level values of a 
certain sample of individuals at a certain place and certain point in time. Expressed values, though 
interesting, should not be the sole basis for cultural difference research because expressed values 
research requires making a number of assumptions about what culture is and how it is transmitted, as 
outlined below. First, using expressed values requires assuming that members of a culture can 
express their values and that standard rating scale instruments can capture cross-national differences 
in these values. Second, it requires assuming that commonality in values is an essential or core 
element of culture. Third, it requires assuming generalizability of values across contexts -- that the 
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values assessed in the workplace, where Hofstede collected data, generalize to values in other 
psychologically meaningful situations so that individuals not sampled from work but from the same 
country would have similar value differences. Fourth, it requires assuming that there is no 
meaningful values change over time. Thus it requires assuming that there is no meaningful 
developmental, temporal, or contextual change -- values expressed by adults at a point in time and in 
one psychologically meaningful context (the workplace in the late 1970’s) provide information 
relevant to other psychologically meaningful situations, other points in time, and other 
developmental or life phases.  
In sum, researchers are using Hofstede’s scores to study issues other than the workplace 
satisfaction issues on which the scores were based. This requires assuming that individualism as 
assessed from working adults in the domain of work is constant, not influenced by large-scale 
economic and political changes over time, applies to other members of the culture and in other life 
domains. Much of this research does not use Hofstede’s scores themselves and simply alludes to 
Hofstede’s (1980) measures as rationale for making cross-cultural comparison. This does not solve 
any of the problems listed previously and because any pair or small set of countries is likely to differ 
in many ways, documenting that responses at the individual level differ in ways one might expect 
given differences in individualism cannot be used to support an individualism-collectivism model of 
cultural difference. Other cultural syndrome models might also explain the particular differences 
examined or the differences may have nothing to do with cultural syndrome.  
In spite of all of these well-known criticisms, a substantial body of research has focused on 
examination of the relationship between assumed country-level difference due to Hofstede’s 
description of individualism (and collectivism) and individual-level outcomes. Work using this 
‘apply Hofstede’ approach continues over 20 years after Hofstede’s categorization and has provided 
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a large number of studies making a link between country-level cultural constructs and individual-
level effects. While problematic given the limitations of expressed values research, this work is both 
the most common form of cross-national research (for an extensive review, see Oyserman, Coon, 
and Kemmelmeier, 2002) and has provided some important cross-cultural insights. For example, 
participants living in countries with higher individualism scores are on average less likely to be 
acquiescent survey responders who simply agree with the opinions of the researcher as implied by 
question content (Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Smith, 2004).  
Direct assessment. The second common approach is to measure “individualism” and 
“collectivism” as individual-difference measures (assessing what Triandis (1995) has termed 
allocentrism and idiocentrism and what Markus and Kitayama (1991) have termed independence and 
interdependence) and to correlate this assessment with individual-level outcomes of interest. This 
allows the researcher to specify that difference in the dependent variable is associated with a 
specified set of internalized and explicitly expressed values. We have labeled this method the 
‘Values Path’ in Figure 1. Researchers who adopt this approach typically ask respondents to rate 
how much they agree with or how important they find a list of behaviors, attitudes, and value 
statements. Although direct assessment avoids some of the assumptions made by those who ‘apply 
Hofstede’, it too has many limitations. This approach assumes cross-national equivalence in how 
questions are understood and rating scales used. It ignores potential cross-cultural differences in the 
extent to which question context (such as the labels on scales) and research context (such as how the 
study, researcher, and other potential participants are presented) influence responses. Perhaps most 
importantly, it assumes that cultural values are a form of declarative knowledge that one can report 
on.  
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Just as the ‘applying Hofstede’ approach has limitations yet provides some insights, here too, 
research based on an expressed value approach has provided some impressive results and some 
meaningful simplifying structure while it is clear that what is meant by culture is more than the 
direct expression of values related to individualism and collectivism. Oyserman, Coon, and 
Kemmelmeier’s (2002) comprehensive meta-analysis of individualism and collectivism data 
provides evidence that in aggregate, studies based on these approaches do generally show the 
expected cross-national differences, with two important exceptions. Japan and to some extent Korea 
generally do not show the expected low valuation of individualism combined with higher valuation 
of collectivism. Some have argued that this anomaly invalidates the values approach; others have 
argued that the college student participants from whom these data were obtained no longer accept 
traditional Japanese and Korean values and that these societies are changing. In either case, research 
procedures based on direct assessment of values are vulnerable to utilizing individual-based analyses 
to make generalizations at the societal level as well as to over-generalizing from findings based on 
college campuses to a society over time. Studying individual differences in values is not necessarily 
isomorphic with studying culture. In this sense, the direct values assessment approach is only 
relevant when used to clarify effects implied from multilevel models and does not pertain to societal-
level analyses. 
Priming cultural frame. The third, increasingly common, approach is to prime “cultural 
frame,” focusing on cuing either individualism or collectivism and assessing the impact of this 
priming on individual-level cognition, affect, and behavior. While focus to date has been on a set of 
primes meant to evoke independence-idiocentrism-individualism or to evoke interdependence-
allocentrism-collectivism, there is no necessary reason that the priming approach could not be used 
more broadly to study other dimensions of culture (e.g., power, face, or honor-modesty). We have 
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labeled this method the ‘Proximal Influence Path’ in Figure 1 because this approach clarifies the 
proximal or immediate causal path of cultural influence by making use of findings in social 
cognition research which consistently shows that habitually or temporarily accessible knowledge 
influences behavior (e.g., Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986).  
Using priming as a method has a number of strengths (for a review, see Oyserman & Lee, in 
press). It allows for specification of posited ‘active ingredients’ of culture and specification that 
observed differences are due to these active ingredients. Because of this tighter causality, priming 
research has the potential to provide more clarity about the active processes that influence outcomes 
and allows for reasoning about culture as an aspect of situated cognition. Using priming facilitates a 
situated cognition approach to culture that highlights culture as dynamic process (Oyserman & Lee, 
in press). How we make sense of situations, the psychological meaning of situations, is due to the 
sense we make of them in the moment. This ‘sense’ flows from naïve theories that are cued in the 
moment, these naïve theories may be universal or culturally specific, cultures may also differ in the 
likelihood that one or another naïve theory will be cued or turned on in a particular situation. 
 Unlike ‘applying Hofstede,’ an experimental priming approach makes it possible to study 
‘culture’ as a dynamic process. For example, when primed with ‘we’ participants sit closer to 
confederates (Holland, Roeder, van Baaren, Brandt, & Hannover, 2004), demonstrating an 
immediate behavioral response to a psychologically meaningful cultural situation that could not be 
studied without a priming manipulation. Moreover, unlike either ‘applying Hofstede’ or ‘direct value 
assessment’ an experimental approach avoids the problems associated with direct assessment such as 
the need to assume that respondents use the scales the same way cross-culturally and that answers 
provided at one time and place generalize to other times and places. By focusing on particular active 
ingredients of individualism and collectivism, the experimental priming approach also allows for 
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tighter causal arguments. Thus, findings using this method can be used as part of a multi-method 
approach to triangulate prior correlational findings. 
However, just as the other approaches have limitations, so does the priming approach. Most 
obviously, ecological validity is sacrificed because the primes must necessarily be narrower than the 
theorized underlying constructs being studied. Thus, much of the initial priming work simply had the 
goal of replicating prior cross-cultural findings to demonstrate that the otherwise cross-societal or 
cross-group effect can be turned on or cued within a society or group (see Oyserman & Lee, in press, 
for a review). More generally, efficacy of this approach depends on operationalization of culture in 
ways relevant to presumed active ingredients of individualism and collectivism. This approach is 
most relevant when used to clarify effects implied from multilevel models. Relevance to societal-
level analyses has not yet been explored. 
As to the current state of the priming literature, a number of other limitations should also be 
noted. With some exceptions (e.g. Chinese participants: Lee, Aaker & Gardner, 2000; Asian and 
Jewish-Americans: Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer, 1998; Korean participants: Oyserman, 
Sorensen, Cha, & Schwarz, 2006; Nepal: Agrawal & Maheswaran, 2005), this approach has been 
used with European-American and Western-European participants. Much of the research focuses on 
effects of priming in a single country, typically the U.S. (e.g., Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002) or 
Germany (e.g. Haberstroh, Oyserman, Schwarz, Kühnen, & Ji, 2002). While clearly not as yet 
comprehensive, an emerging strength of the approach comes from consistent evidence that priming 
collectivism in European-American and Western-European samples increases subsequent collective 
content in self-concept, salience of collective values, and sense of closeness to others. Using this 
parallel between cross-national and priming study results provides some support that priming-study 
findings in domains that have been less extensively studied in cross-national research, such as 
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cognitive processing, are also likely to find parallels in naturally occurring cultural settings (for a 
review see Oyserman & Lee, in press). 
 
Strengths of Approaches Aimed at Predicting Individual-level Outcomes  
Taken together the multilevel ‘individual-level consequences’ approaches to studying culture 
all focus on the extent that culture can be said to pattern or define individual-level differences in 
self-concept, cognition, affect, and behavior. In this sense, work in this area focuses on the extent 
that meaningful between-cultural group individual differences can be found over and above 
meaningful within-cultural group individual differences. Social psychologists have long studied the 
effects of social contexts, whether immediate and proximal or more distal and abstract on self-
concept, cognition, affect, and behavior. Cultural psychology reminds us that contexts and their 
meaning may be differently organized in different societies. The question asked is whether all 
societies provide the same psychologically meaningful situations with the same frequency, differ in 
the frequency that these situations are likely to be encountered, or differ in the psychological 
meaning of the situations themselves. These are multilevel questions that are answerable by 
triangulated use of multi-method approaches, though each of the currently used approaches has 
limitations when used alone.  
In terms of cognition, for example, research in this area asks if something about cultural 
contexts systematically predicts average processing speed, on-line perception, focus of spontaneous 
recall and the like. Thus, Kitayama and his colleagues show within-Japan heterogeneity in relative 
ease of processing context-independent vs. context-dependent information that is associated with 
coming from or moving to frontier areas (Kitayama et al., 2006). Similarly, Oyserman and her 
colleagues show that priming ‘I’ relative to ‘we’ speeds processing on a color Stroop task and that 
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this effect occurs both in the U.S. as well as in Korea (Oyserman et al., 2006). Taken together, 
studies of these types begin to provide information about what constitutes psychologically 
meaningful contexts and about the likely patterning of responses to these contexts. 
 Multilevel models provide a structured process model within which to make inferences about 
the psychological meaning of societal-level and group-level differences. These models cannot 
provide straightforward reverse predictions in that knowing about individual differences does not 
provide prediction to group-level or society-level factors (Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004).  
  
Predicting Societal-Level Outcome Variables  
While psychologists have focused on multilevel models in which societal and contextual 
factors are posited to predict individual-level outcomes, some researchers have focused on societal-
level outcomes. Often this research involves a distal culture or values approach in that researchers 
seek to document meaningful correlations between an aggregated individual score (typically 
Hofstede’s country-level aggregate scores, but also including for example, Inglehart’s World Value 
Survey score or Schwarz’s value scores) or country-level scores assigned by Triandis (using an 
expert-rating technique) and nation-level variables such as GNP or language structure (e.g., is it 
grammatically correct to drop personal pronouns?). Some research in this vein does not attempt to 
directly assess individually aggregated values but rather focuses entirely on country-level variables, 
arguing that if certain cultural syndromes do in fact exist, then certain country-level (or region-level) 
patterns should exist.  For example, Vandello and Cohen (1999) have examined societal-level 
antecedents (population density) and consequences (e.g. divorce rates) of collectivism. Cohen (2006) 
also explores how cultural factors (i.e., culture of honor) moderate the relationship between societal 
antecedents (e.g., unequal treatment of women) and societal-level consequences (e.g., GNP). In this 
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section, we outline a general process model that incorporates current cultural research focused on 
societal-level outcomes (Figure 2). 
A process model 
As can be seen in Figure 2, evolution and ecological environment (box 1) are assumed to 
influence both distal culture (language, religion, ideologies, histories, box 2) and the kind of values a 
society is likely to promulgate (box 5). As in the multilevel model, distal culture is assumed to 
influence social structural (box 3), social situational (box 4) and societal value (box 5) aspects of 
culture. Social structures (e.g. legal systems), social situations (e.g. classrooms and schooling, 
markets and shopping), and societal values (e.g. honor, dignity, social cohesion, stranger trust) are 
posited to influence societal-level consequences (box 6) such as birth rates, marriage and divorce 
rates, suicide rates, GNP, gender equality, and income equity.   
Both multilevel and societal-level models assume influence of evolution and ecology on 
distal culture and posit an impact of distal culture on social structure, social situations and values. 
The process models diverge however in how and at what level values (box 5) and social situations 
(box 4) are operationalized. In the multilevel model, the values assessed are those internalized by 
individuals and the situations assessed are those which individuals encounter. In a societal-level 
model, the focus is on societal, not individual, processes and outcomes. While some researchers 
using a societal-level approach have obtained values via direct assessment (e.g., the World Values 
Survey approach), that is aggregating across individuals to obtain national values scores. However, it 
is possible to infer societal-level values without resorting to direct assessment of individuals. For 
example, values can be obtained via coding societal artifacts such as ad campaigns, school books, 
children’s stories, or movies.  
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With regard to social situations, level of analyses differences can also be discerned. Societal-
level process models focus on the likely sociological meaning of everyday situations given their 
interest in society-level prediction, whereas multilevel process models focus on the likely 
psychological meaning of everyday situations given their interest in individual-level prediction. For 
example, to the extent that collectivism increases likelihood of distrusting out-groups and feeling 
obligated to in-groups, , everyday situations in collective societies are more likely to be 
particularized rather than bureaucratized and all things being equal, situations in which interactions 
are with an in-group member will be preferred over those involving strangers. Take the everyday 
situation of shopping, a societal-level analysis would ask whether the shopping is likely to occur at 
family-run small stores or chain stores, face-to-face or on-line, and whether credit cards are likely or 
unlikely to be part of the transaction. One set of everyday situations sets up personalized face-to-face 
interactions that do not require trust in strangers whereas the other sets up depersonalized and 
anonymous interactions that do require stranger trust. Although with time passing cultures may 
adopt itself to changing circumstances, in China for example, the American tradition of catalogue 
sales has not caught on, and its modern equivalent, internet sales, requires adjustment. Thus, credit 
card or cash is often provided only when the product is delivered in person and examined rather than 
trusting that a stranger will provide the product as depicted on the internet (Bin & Chen, 2003; 
Martinson, 2002; Reichheld & Schefter, 2003).  
Evidence for paths within the process model 
 Generally, research focused on societal-level outcomes has focused on either the association 
between distal cultural factors and social structures or social situations, or the association between 
social structures and societal-level outcomes. To clarify the implicit models underlying this work, in 
Figure 2 we have labeled the former ‘distal’ path models and the latter ‘structural influence’ path 
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models. This work is necessarily less likely to involve experimental manipulation, providing less 
emphasis on empirical examination of process.  
Distal paths. Some societal-level research examines differences in features that make up 
distal culture (labeled ‘direct distal’ in Figure 2) with the assumption that the effect of distal culture 
should be felt as societal-level difference in the present. This research focuses on characteristics of 
language as a carrier of cultural meaning with implications for societal outcomes. Some research 
focuses on regional difference within language. For example, Southern-Italian insults are more 
relational than Northern-Italian insults, which the authors associate with collectivism in the South 
and individualism in the North (Semin & Rubini, 1990). Other research focuses on cross-language 
patterns. Thus, as previously noted, Hofstede-scored low individualism is more common in societies 
using languages in which it is grammatically correct to drop pronouns (Kashima & Kashima, 1998; 
2003).  
Other societal-level research considers the effect of distal cultural features as mediated by 
structures, situations, and values, as can be seen in Figure 2, we have labeled these mediational 
pathways ‘distal path 1’, ‘distal path 2’, and ‘distal path 3’ respectively. The association between 
individualism-collectivism and social structural variables has attracted considerable attention. 
Particular attention has been paid to the possibility that individualism assessed as a value score, is 
related to societal growth and economic outcomes. Thus, Hofstede reported a negative relationship 
between aggregated nation-level individualism scores and a country’s population, population density 
and demographic growth (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). Across studies affluence is associated with 
individualism. Thus, GNP is positively correlated with Hofstede’s individualism scores (e.g., 
Georgas et al., 2004; Hofstede, 1980; Van Hemert, van de Vijver, Poortinga, & Georgas, 2002), 
GNP is positively correlated with Schwartz’s autonomy versus conservation dimension (akin to 
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individualism-collectivism, Schwartz, 1994), economic productivity is positively correlated with 
expert ratings of individualism (Levine, Norenzayan, & Philbrick, 2001), and economic prosperity is 
positively correlated with self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997).2  
In addition to the focus on social structure, some societal-level research focuses on the 
association between distal culture factors and social situations; these studies typically assert that the 
countries or societies they are comparing differed in Hofstede’s analyses and seek to examine 
differences in social values as expressed in social situations, such as pace of life, content of 
advertisements and framing of news reports. For example, Levine and Norenzayan (1999) examined 
the correlation between individualism as rated by Harry Triandis and pace of life as operationalized 
by average pace in walking and average speed of postal delivery, finding that speed is positively 
associated with country-level individualism. With regard to advertisements, popular Korean 
magazine advertisements focus primarily on conformity whereas popular American magazine 
advertisements focus primarily on uniqueness themes (Kim & Markus, 1999); Korean 
advertisements are also more likely to emphasize family well-being, in-group goals, and 
interdependence than U.S. advertisements (Han & Shavitt, 1994). With regard to framing of news, 
sports articles and editorials published in Hong Kong newspapers use situational attribution to a 
                                                
2 It seems reasonable to assume that the relationship between individualism and prosperity is 
likely to be bi-directional. On the one hand, high individualism may encourage economic activity 
and low individualism may encourage large families. On the other hand, it is also likely to be that as 
affluence rises, one is more able to stand separately from in-group members and as births per family 
increases so does the necessity of sharing both physical and social space.   
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greater extent and dispositional attributions to a lesser frequency than those published in American 
newspapers (Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996).   
 Structural influence paths. Assessing a cultural syndrome is problematic. As we indicated 
earlier, the aggregated values or attitudes approach is limited in that it assumes that culture is a series 
of statements that can be made about how one engages the world. Moreover, the relationship 
between social structure and societal consequence variables has been studied correlationally. The 
difficulty in empirically assessing cultural syndrome separate from its consequences can be seen by 
the fact that the variables we have represented as consequences of cultural syndromes have been 
used by Vandello and Cohen (1999) as indicators of cultural syndrome. Their collectivism index 
used an array of what we have termed societal-level consequences variables (percentage of people 
living alone, percentage of elderly people living alone, percentage of households with grandchildren 
in them, divorce to marriage ratio, percentage of people with no religious affiliation, average 
percentage voting libertarian over the past presidential elections, ratio of people carpooling to work 
to people driving alone, and percentage of self-employed workers) and found a positive correlation 
between these factors and social-structural variables -- population density, percentage of individuals 
engaged in herding, ratio of laborers to farmers, production of cotton, tobacco, and rice, percentage 
of minorities in a state, percentage of slaves per state. They also found a negative correlation 
between these factors and suicide rates, percentage of adults classified as binge drinkers, per capita 
proportion of artists and authors, gender and racial equality as well as negative correlations with 
affluence and proportion of farms that were independently operated.  Taken together, these results 
strongly suggest a cultural syndrome is operating but the syndrome itself remains a latent, not-well-
operationalized variable to the extent that average explicit value or attitude statements have to-date 
been the only alternate operationalization method. Other methods – such as content coding from a 
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culture’s literature, story books, newspapers, or advertisements – might provide a better latent 
operationalization.  
The Direction of Influence  
 Because societal-level variables can be subjected to correlational but not experimental 
studies, direction of effects is open to debate. A number of authors provide evidence that wealth 
should be considered an antecedent rather than a consequence of individualism. Thus, Hofstede 
(1991), relying on his analysis over time, suggests that it is wealth that leads to individualism. He 
indicates that prosperity makes it possible for people to have more freedom of choice, more 
individual resources and to behave more selfishly. Japan provides a good example: Economic 
prosperity is associated with erosion of collectivism and more emphasis in individualism; Kelly 
(1991) argues that current Japanese cohorts are higher in hedonism and materialism, lower in 
commitment to societal good, and more likely to stress individual needs over community than earlier 
cohorts. 
 Similarly, Inglehart (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) in his societal-level and over-
time data has shown that self-expression values increase over time as economic prosperity increases. 
Moreover, Inglehart’s data also show that large intergenerational differences exist in wealthy 
societies with younger birth cohorts emphasizing self-expression values more than older cohorts. 
Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) argue that citizens in societies experiencing economic prosperity 
(rather than scarcity) are less likely to focus primarily on maintaining their material existence, which 
emancipates people from the cultural restrictions on personal choice necessary under conditions of 
scarcity. They further argue that economic development facilitates a shift toward the free choice 
aspects of individualism and away from the traditional survival aspects of collectivism, producing 
increasing emphasis on individual freedom-focused values and weakening the focus on traditional 
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hierarchies. These arguments are further supported by Kagitcibasi and Ataca (2005) who 
documented changes in value of children in Turkey when compared with three decades ago. The 
most notable change was the sharp increase in the psychological value of the child and the 
corresponding decrease in its utilitarian/economic value, including old-age security value. They 
argued that economic growth and higher education levels contributed to changes in the values people 
attach to their children. These perspectives suggest that societal wealth may be considered an 
ecological factor much like weather and social conditions rather than as a consequence of culture.  
 Wealth alone does not determine country-level individualism. Religion, philosophy and 
historical experience interface with wealth. For example, although self-expression or individualism 
values increase as economic prosperity increases, rate of increase is dependent in part on religious 
and philosophical worldviews and historical experiences (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
Historically Protestant, Orthodox, Islamic and Confucian societies cluster in cultural zones with 
distinctive value systems that persist even as economic development produces shift toward 
individualism (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).  
 
Levels Issues in Cultural Research 
 We outlined both a multilevel cultural process model focused on individual-level 
consequences of culture and a societal-level cultural process model focused on societal-level 
consequences of culture. In each model, research clusters in small portions of the full model, 
suggesting that much research still needs to be completed if these assumed cultural processes are to 
be tested. Moreover, the societal-level model in particular suffers from lack of clarity about 
causality. Thus, it seems equally reasonable to argue that small family size increases individualism 
as to argue that individualism reduces desire to have large families. It is likely that both are true at 
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some level, leading to ambiguity with regard to hypothesis testing. Equally problematic is the lack of 
any articulation of how cultural studies at the individual and societal levels are to be integrated to 
move the field forward.   
Clearly, theories can focus on individuals or on groups or societies and in order for research 
to produce plausible evidence of the impact of cultural syndromes, the level at which a theory is 
articulated should match the level at which constructs are operationalized and assessed and the level 
of statistical analysis (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Rousseau, 1985). This seemingly 
straightforward suggestion is complicated in research domains such as cultural psychology that 
explicitly cross levels. Problems arise when measurement and analyses at one level are used to make 
inferences at other levels.  
For example, cultural researchers commonly collect and compare individual-level data from 
two countries that Hofstede (1980) argued differ in individualism. Using country as a factor, they 
report any significant difference found as being a consequence of individualism. Another common 
approach is to collect both values responses and responses to another individual-level variable and 
when the two are correlated, report any significant difference in the individual-level variable as 
being a consequence of individualism. These common techniques may suffer from level of analyses 
problems to the extent that individual-level results cannot be used to draw conclusions about groups.  
That the individuals differ does not necessarily mean that the societies differ in cultural syndrome 
(see Chapter 1). A number of authors have made this point; Schwartz (1992, 1994) shows some 
differences in how values cluster and which are correlated to one another depending on whether 
individual responses are aggregated at national levels and then analyzed or analyzed at the individual 
level (see also, Bond et al., 2004; Diener & Diener, 1995; Oishi, Diener, Lucas, & Suh, 1999; Hui, 
Triandis, & Yee, 1991). One reason for differences in data patterns between individuals and societies 
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can be due to nomological networks that lead to differences in meaning of a concept at different 
levels of aggregation. 
 
Ecological Fallacy and Cross-Cultural Research  
 Indeed, concomitant emphasis on the individual as source of information and society as unit 
of generalization in cultural psychology can lead to problems described as the ecological fallacy – 
use of insight from one level of analyses to incorrectly draw inferences at other levels of analyses 
(Pedhazur, 1982; Robinson, 1950). For example, a researcher interested in whether collectivism as a 
cultural syndrome increases or decreases particularized treatment rather than bureaucratized 
treatment of individuals by public services may gather information about informal protection 
networks within public systems, levels of institutional corruption or institutionalized bribery of 
public officials.  Finding patterned particularized treatment associated with differences in societies 
may allow for assertions about the impact of collectivism as a cultural syndrome on institutional 
processes. It does not allow for predictions about individual-level variables like personal honesty. As 
another example, a researcher interested in whether individualism and collectivism as cultural 
syndromes influence the intensity and closeness of interpersonal relationships may gather 
information about size and density of personal support networks. Finding patterned differences in 
density of personal relationships associated with differences in societies may allow for assertions 
about the impact of collectivism as a cultural frame on personal support processes. It does not allow 
for predictions about societal-level variables like the existence of government-sponsored safety nets 
such as hospitals or institutional care for the elderly or indigent.  
Although processes at the individual- and societal-levels may be the same, there is no 
guarantee that this would necessarily be the case (e.g., because third variables may be involved). 
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What appears to be a relationship between, for example, collectivism and public institutional 
corruption may not appear at the individual level, and the reverse, what appears to be a relationship 
between collectivism and natural support networks may not appear at the societal-level (e.g., Chan, 
1998; Leung, 1989). A similar phenomenon has been described as Simpson’s paradox (e.g., Fiedler, 
2000; Schaller, 1992; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 1995). That is, distinct relationships may appear at 
different levels of analysis, which, when decomposed, may not be present or may be present in 
opposing directions – the variables may sometimes have positive relationships, at other times 
negative relationships or no relationship at the separate levels (e.g., Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, & 
Nickel, 2003).  
Take for example an association between willingness to care for relatives at home and 
Hofstede-assessed low individualism. While appearing robust, the association may be due to a third 
factor, for example, personal or societal wealth. Though on average country-level individualism and 
country-level wealth may be correlated, the association of country-level individualism and 
willingness to care for relatives at home may be mediated by wealth. For example, wealth (both 
personal and societal) may influence the relationship between individualism and care for relatives by 
influencing whether alternatives to home-care are feasible or exist. Thus those living in low 
individualism countries may be more willing to care for relatives at home not because they feel 
closer to their relatives, more obligated to them, or define themselves more in social obligation than 
personal satisfaction terms, rather, they may report more willingness to care for relatives at home 
because on average there are no viable alternatives. Similarly, those living in high individualism 
countries may be less willing to care for relatives at home not because they feel less close to their 
relatives but because the structure of the labor market is such that no one is home to supervise care. 
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Indeed, cultural researchers have weighed in on this issue. Bond (2002) argues that the 
common ecological fallacy committed in cross-cultural psychology involves assuming that nation-
level individualism or collectivism can be used to explain observed individual-level differences. 
Similarly, Schwartz (1994) describes the ecological fallacy as a logical fallacy and problem of 
construct validity in that one assumes that because a group has certain characteristics the members of 
the group should also have the same characteristics. As cited in Schwartz (1994) an informative 
example is provided by Zito (1975) who points to the discrepancy between a hung jury as a group 
and as individual members. As a group, a hung jury is an indecisive jury, unable to decide whether 
the accused is guilty or not. However, inferring that the members of that jury are also indecisive 
would be wrong. On the contrary, the reason the jury is ‘hung’ is because its members are very 
decisive, and having decided, they not willing to change their minds.  
Extending this issue to cultural psychology, suggests, for example, that a society may be 
characterized as having many stay-at-home mothers and few working mothers so that as a group, its 
citizens seem to value traditional family roles and centralize motherhood. Individual mothers may 
have little choice but to stay home, to the extent that the society also lacks structured day care and 
has short school days and traditional workplaces. Thus, citizens themselves may not choose 
traditional family roles so much as live with them. This suggests that even in multilevel models that 
can make individual-level predictions, care must be taken not to infer individual choice when what is 
observed is societal or structural patterning of choice.  
Generally though, if cultural research is to make predictions about individuals, it must 
involve the impact of societal-level factors on individual-level variables; these cross-level models 
are not problematic in principle (Klein et al, 1994; Schwartz, 1994). Indeed, cross-level models can 
better be handled by using new-generation analytic techniques such as hierarchical linear modeling 
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which allow individuals to be nested in social contexts rather than ignoring the potential for 
individuals from the same contexts to be more similar in their responses than individuals from 
different contexts. Because societal-level factors influence societal outcomes and the individuals that 
make up those societies, this is not a problem. Problems arise when individual-level meaning is 
drawn from societal-level data or when individual-level data and analyses are used to draw society-
level conclusions. Rather than assume that individual-level correlations are associated with parallel 
society-level correlations, it may be more useful to broaden experimentally-based enquiry into the 
active ingredients of culture. This entails examining social contexts and social situations in which 
these active ingredients may be embedded or cued, and study them separately. 
 
Future directions 
We argued that generative model building and hypothesis testing in the domain of cultural 
psychology has benefited from narrowing focus to more specifically operationalizable constructs 
such as individualism and collectivism. This does not mean that future research should not begin to 
expand beyond this conceptualization. By operationalizing culture as a multilevel and societal-level 
process likely to influence individual-level and society-level phenomena, our goal was to map out 
what the likely processes of cultural influence are at each level and provide some feel for the kinds 
of research that has focused on the various posited paths in each of these models. We explored the 
possibility that research in cultural psychology may be vulnerable to a level of analysis problem, as 
formulated by the ecological fallacy or as Simpson’s paradox.  
The linkages between culture as society-level antecedents and culture as individual-level 
consequences have been tested primarily by either assuming that Hofstede’s initial ratings are stable 
and generalizable over time and context or by obtaining individualism and collectivism value 
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endorsement ratings and correlating them with a dependent variable of interest (all individual-level 
data). Both of these approaches are thus built on the assumption that individual-level value ratings, 
either aggregated, or used at the individual level, reflect an important aspect of culture which has 
implications for societal-level and individual-level outcomes. Alternative approaches have been 
sought to broaden research by increasing experimental control over the active ingredients of 
individualism or collectivism brought to mind in the moment, as well as to broaden research by 
utilizing constructs that do not depend on values ratings.  
Of course the benefit of experimental studies that seek to prime active ingredients of culture 
and then document that these active ingredients have the hypothesized effects is the power of 
experimental models to provide support for causal hypotheses. The question raised by these studies 
is whether the effects shown at the individual level can plausibly provide evidence in support of the 
hypothesized societal effects of individualism and collectivism. At first pass, there clearly seems to 
be a level of analysis concern, to the extent that an author would argue that the results demonstrate 
processes occurring at the societal level. Our read of the current literature is that authors using a 
priming methodology have been careful to avoid making these kinds of claims, often limiting their 
discussion of priming effects to evoked content of conceptual knowledge and not attempting 
generalizations about consequences for cultures (see Oyserman & Lee, in press for a review). One 
way for future research to utilize these findings is to begin to sample everyday face-to-face situated 
social contexts systematically and to begin to study the extent that these situations prime or make 
salient constructs that parallel those made salient in priming research. To the extent that this can be 
documented, then priming studies will be better linked to societal-level antecedents. 
In addition to priming studies, a number of ecological models focused more directly on 
context, specifically attempting to make connections between physical and geographical factors, 
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cultural syndromes and individual differences due to culture (Berry, 1994; Triandis, 1972; Whiting, 
1963, 1976). These efforts and analyses of societal-level antecedents and consequences of culture 
(e.g. Vandello & Cohen, 1999; Inglehart, 1997) are important because they provide a broader 
framework for developing testable hypotheses both about stability and change in individualism and 
collectivism and other cultural constructs. However, just as it is not possible to generalize back from 
individual differences to make the case that social groups differ, showing group-level effects does 
not necessarily provide predictions for individuals within the groups.  
Moreover, focusing only on the societal level has a number of often overlooked problems. 
Clearly, it dramatically limits statistical power. If analyses are conducted only at the country level, 
even large-scale cross-national studies sample relatively few countries – a sample of six countries 
becomes an effective n of six. Other non-country level designs leave room to examine differences by 
region or within country. Indeed, future research using a regional approach might increase both 
power and specificity of prediction by including both regions within countries and regions across 
countries. Appropriate statistical analysis such as hierarchical linear modeling that allows for 
analyses of individuals nested within countries increases power but still requires relatively large 
numbers of countries (e.g. six or more) for analyses. Moreover, country-level comparisons are only 
sensible if they compare similarly representative samples. 
Typically cross-national comparisons that describe individual-level effects involve 
convenience samples of college students (for a review see, Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier, 
2002). Those focused on societal-level effects provide exceptions; Schwartz (1994) used school 
teachers and, in most countries, Inglehart (1997) used random samples of adults, and both Smith 
(2004) and Vandello and Cohen (1999) used representative samples (albeit as secondary analyses of 
samples collected for other purposes). Given the expense of carrying out large multinational studies, 
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replication of results across samples or even incremental hypotheses-testing is extremely difficult. 
Therefore, societal-level analyses are likely to continue to focus on individual countries as case 
studies. Reading across case studies can provide working hypotheses for priming studies that can at 
least be replicated cross-nationally.  
 Sensitivity to the ecological fallacy reduces risk of concluding that characteristics of 
individual members of a group can be predicted by average characteristics of the group – such as 
concluding that country-level policies and services for the elder can be used to predict individual-
level respect for the elderly.  Sensitivity to Simpson’s paradox reduces risk of concluding that 
patterns that hold at one level of aggregation are likely to predict patterns at disaggregated levels. 
Thus for example, it would be inappropriate to conclude that collectivists are generally more 
cooperative and interdependent than individualists based on samples of these behaviors with in-
group or family members because collectivists may well not be more interdependent with non in-
group and non family members. Indeed, there is evidence that they are not (e.g., Matsumoto, 1990; 
Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996).  
Simpson’s paradox reminds us that it is not possible to predict higher-level relationships (in 
this case between collectivism and cooperation in general) from one disaggregated component 
relationship (in this case between collectivism and cooperation in a family or in-group situation). 
Indeed, a number of researchers have called for sampling of situations in which cultural practices are 
engaged (e.g. D’Andrade, 2001; Farr, 1991; Geertz, 1973). By sampling situations, it will be 
possible to see if societies do or do not differ in the situations in which a practice is engaged. It will 
also be possible to then use the situation as a prime and assess the extent that individuals in different 
countries respond uniformly to situations once presented, whether or not they are naturally occurring 
within a society. An example of this is work by Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakknukit 
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(1997) who had students describe self-esteem enhancing and deflating situations and found both 
differences between Japan and the U.S. in the situations generated and similarities between Japan 
and the U.S. when Japanese were presented with American situations and vice versa. 
While it is important to be aware of level of analysis issues, in some ways Simpson’s 
paradox provides an important venue for considering the level of aggregation currently being 
assessed in cultural research. Rather than simply assuming that the sampled relationships found can 
be generalized to the general universe of possible relationships, it is important to ask whether the 
nature of the data collection process led to different foci (e.g. participants in collective societies 
responding to questions in terms of how they would behave with in-group members vs. participants 
in individualistic cultures responding to questions in terms of how they would behave with 
strangers). At the societal level, culture-related variables cannot be subjected to experimentation. It 
is neither possible to manipulate a society’s native language nor to randomly assign children to 
educational systems. Therefore, at the societal level, evidence must be mostly correlational and 
therefore open to alternate explanations or to influences by additional variables that have not yet 
been considered.  One possible way forward is to use those natural experiments that occur – such as 
regime changes and economic shifts. Another possibility is to set up ecologically valid experiments, 
for example, Marian and Kaushanskaya’s (2004) study of individual vs. collective content in 
memories of participants randomly assigned to recall in Russian or English. While important, neither 
of these solutions provides the kind of flexibility to study posited processes as do experimental 
manipulation, thus it seems likely that cultural psychology will continue to move between and across 
process models of culture that are multilevel and those that are societal-level only.  
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Figure 1. Culture as a multilevel process influencing individual-level outcomes  
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